The Idea of an Iraqi Threat: A Constructivist Analysis of George W. Bushs Securitizing Move After 9/11 by Oung Byun & Alexander Schotthoefer
The Idea of an Iraqi Threat: A Constructivist Analysis of 
George W. Bush’s Securitizing Move After 9/11
Alexander Schotthoefer & Oung Byun
Existing literature explaining the origin of the Iraq War is often either not sufficiently compatible 
with securitization theory’s assumptions or overlooks the importance of the dynamics preceding the 
securitization attempt. This article thus seeks to explain why George W. Bush decided to securitize 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq by focusing on an individual level analysis of the U.S. president. The article 
utilizes Roxanna Sjöstedt’s framework that includes the analysis of the idea diffusion process, identities 
as potential facilitators of idea acceptance and beliefs that affect the individual internalization of the 
said idea. The results show that all three factors were decisive for the securitization of Iraq to occur. 
Furthermore, they suggest the implication that individual-level factors also have significant and 
independent explanatory value in addition to more conventional system-level analyses of international 
security.
Keywords: Iraq War, Securitization, Idea Diffusion, Identity, Beliefs, Operational Code
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
After the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush 
officially declared war on terror. In this context, the Bush administration accused Iraq of 
possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in an attempt to establish a connection 
between the Iraqi leadership and the new terrorist threat. The Iraq War seems especially 
controversial in hindsight because the WMDs, which served as a justification for the 
necessity of war, were not found, even after Saddam Hussein was removed from power. 
Thus, the assumptions on which the George W. Bush administration based its decision to go 
to war turned out to be false. Due to these circumstances, this article aims at illuminating the 
discrepancy between the invasion of Iraq and the lack of an Iraqi threat. 
1.2. Literature Review
The reasons behind the controversial decision for the Iraq War, as well as the potential 
motivations of certain individual actors and the administration as a whole, have been subject 
to scrutiny by many scholars. Ahsan I. Butt, for example, sees the Iraq War as a struggle to 
reinforce American hegemony (2019). David A. Lake holds that Saddam Hussein’s inability 
to credibly commit to not developing WMDs, together with “informational asymmetries,” 
help understand the occurrence of the Iraq War (2010). 
Other scholars correspond to this article’s research in the sense that they identify potential 
reasons for the invasion on the individual level. David Patrick Houghton, drawing from 
political psychology, speculates about various potential reasons that may have contributed 
to the Iraq War decision. Some of the factors suggested by Houghton are impulsive gut 
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decisions, the principle of the drunkard’s search —“[looking] for evidence in psychologically 
convenient [italics in the original] places”—the attempt to keep cognitive consistency and the 
groupthink phenomenon which can explain “dysfunctional behavior in groups” (2008). Colin 
Campbell tells the following causal story about the decision: the administration had 
[personalized] the struggle against al Qaeda as a matter of “getting” Osama bin Laden. When 
bin Laden’s escape, probably to Pakistan, proved that approach a failure, the political impasse thus 
created left the road open for administration hawks who had long been interested in overthrowing 
Saddam Hussein to change the subject and press for regime change in Iraq. This gambit played so 
well to the president’s natural reflexes that it gained primacy within the political executive without 
a rigorous examination of the complexities of its implementation or the potential damage it could 
do to U.S. standing in the global community. (2004) 
With this explanation, as this article’s analysis shows, Campbell gets close to the 
core of the issue in two important regards: Firstly, the neoconservatives did indeed push 
for the removal of Saddam Hussein quite firmly when they saw the opportunity to do so 
effectively. Secondly, Bush’s personality mattered a great deal in subsequently putting the 
issue on the administration’s agenda. However, much more attention needs to be paid to 
the role of identity constructions and personal beliefs to add explanatory weight to these 
factors. Furthermore, much of the already existing literature is characterized by a theoretical 
incompatibility with securitization theory.
This theory posits that security problems are not pre-given but socially constructed. 
Through a speech act that describes an issue as an existential threat, the issue becomes a 
security problem (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). Because the alleged Iraqi threat 
proved to be wrong, viewing the nature of security through the lens of securitization theory 
can be very useful in this case (Hughes, 2007). An apparent securitization process took place, 
which turned Iraq into a security issue that necessitated immediate action. The Iraqi regime 
was eventually presented as a threat that required measures beyond normal politics (Hughes, 
2007). This depiction constituted the securitizing move.
When looking at this case from this perspective, it becomes evident that realist attempts 
at explaining the Iraq War—even if not necessarily wrong—are not sufficient concerning the 
dynamics they can effectively demonstrate. Because of the lack of convincing evidence for a 
substantial threat emanating from Iraq, a constructivist security theory becomes more useful. 
As Bryn Hughes writes, “[i]f it is shown there is a weak connection between the practice 
of security and the existence of material threat factors, then traditional perspectives falter, 
whereas securitization’s theoretical utility is apparent” (2007).
Even though literature that applies securitization theory to the case of Iraq exists, there 
remains a gap regarding the explanation of Bush’s securitizing move. Hughes’ analysis, 
for instance, focuses on the securitization process after the securitizing move. Hughes 
looks at the events preceding the Iraq War to find out if securitization theory can serve as a 
potent tool for explaining this case. He makes an essential contribution through his finding 
that securitization is indeed useful and appropriate in this context (2007). Consequently, it 
becomes viable to speak of the existence of a securitizing move performed by George W. 
Bush and to make an attempt to explain it. However, Hughes more or less views the Bush 
administration as one unit and suggests political motives as a significant reason for the 
securitization (2007). Here, the authors of this article disagree with Hughes. This article 
argues that George W. Bush, as the most important and powerful securitizing actor, needs to 
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be analytically divorced from the rest of the administration. Furthermore, Bush’s motivation 
for securitizing Iraq was based to a great extent on his perception of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
as a threat. 
Additionally to the research done on the securitization process itself, some authors focus 
on the audience acceptance that made the securitization of Iraq successful. Ciaran O’Reilly, 
for instance, tries to contribute to answering the question of why the U.S.’ securitization 
of Iraq was successful. He concludes that the American media played an important role in 
the public support of military intervention by not only being influenced by the post-9/11 
patriotism that prevailed at the time but also by reinforcing it (2008).
Ido Oren and Ty Solomon offer a reinterpretation of the securitization of Iraq. They argue 
that the securitization was successful due to the “collective chanting of a phrase”: weapons 
of mass destruction (2015: 316). The acceptance of securitization theory as a useful tool for 
explaining the Iraq War is growing. Nevertheless, none of these studies sufficiently explain 
the dynamics that led to the securitizing move itself.
This gap results in the article’s research question: Why did George W. Bush perform 
this securitizing move? By answering this question, the article explains the securitization of 
Iraq and contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the decision to invade Iraq. 
It further attempts to show that Bush as an individual actor and his perception—in contrast 
to political motives—were decisive. Furthermore, the article’s relevance can be found 
in offering another empirical example for Roxanna Sjöstedt’s framework for explaining 
securitizing moves, which is used to approximate the answer to the above-posed question.
1.3. Methodology
1.3.1. Theoretical Framework
Sjöstedt’s framework follows a particular logic: When a specific idea is diffused, 
identities play a role in its rejection or acceptance by the decision-maker or securitizing actor. 
The degree of the subsequent internalization of the idea, which is influenced by the beliefs of 
the securitizing individual, is then decisive for whether an idea of a security threat is brought 
onto the agenda or not. The securitizing move follows from this process (2013). In actuality, 
however, the individual processes do not necessarily take place chronologically. They can be 
very much intertwined. 
Sjöstedt’s approach is useful because it allows for explaining why something is framed 
as a security problem at a specific instant of time (2013). Without tracing the internalization 
process of the idea the alleged threat is based on, it is impossible to tell when and for what 
reason the person in question made up his or her mind about an issue. Systemic theories 
are not well-suited for this endeavor because demonstrating the internalization is not viable 
without an individual-level analysis. This circumstance constitutes one of the reasons why 
Sjöstedt’s framework proves much more beneficial than system-level theories of international 
relations such as conventional constructivism and neorealism.
The latter is not an appropriate tool for investigating how threats are created in any case. 
As Sjöstedt argues, “because neorealism views threats as objective and existing externally 
to individual perceptions, the whole problematization of threat construction becomes moot” 
(2013). It does not explain why some of the allegedly real threats become urgent security 
issues, while others with similar characteristics do not. 
On the contrary, however, despite constructivism’s being mainly concerned with 
the international system as the subject of analysis, this examination heavily draws on 
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constructivist assumptions. It can thus be called a constructivist analysis. The analytical 
framework adopted in this article, for instance, borrows the presumption that independent 
variables do not necessarily have to be material. Besides, constructivist security analysis 
often regards both ideas and identities as central concepts. However, by comprising 
individual internalization, the framework at use here deviates from “the constructivist focus 
on structures as determinants to behavior” (Sjöstedt, 2013).
1.3.2. Method
Methodically, the article utilizes textual analysis of primary and secondary sources with 
an interpretative method.1 The internalization process is tracked through differences over time 
since they can be useful for determining an internalization (Sjöstedt, 2013). If the analysis 
finds significant change over time—meaning that later statements or behavior embrace the 
diffused idea—an internalization of the idea can be assumed. The analysis of Bush’s beliefs 
interprets the findings by drawing from the congruence procedure, which Alexander L. 
George describes as the conclusion from a consistency of the individual’s beliefs with the 
decision made—in this case, a securitizing move—to a potential causal character of the said 
beliefs. The interpretation of the effects of the beliefs on the decision is made deductively 
(1979). This article’s analysis is organized according to the three analytical steps in Sjöstedt’s 
framework. First, the idea diffusion process is demonstrated. The following chapter then 
illuminates identities that influenced the idea’s acceptance. Lastly, the analysis focuses on 
Bush’s beliefs and examines the degree to which he internalized the said idea.
2. THE DIFFUSION PROCESS OF THE THREAT IDEA (1996–2001) 
2.1. Neoconservative Efforts to Demonstrate the Iraqi Threat Before 9/11
As Jeffrey Record states, “momentum for a war with Iraq had existed before 9/11 and 
even before President George W. Bush took office” (2010). Thus, efforts to spread the idea 
have been made already significantly earlier than George W. Bush’s first administration. The 
most influential ideological camp regarding the presentation of Iraq as a threat to the U.S. 
was the neoconservatives. Neoconservatives are convinced that the concepts of democracy 
and freedom can be used to defeat evil. They further advocate “an activist and interventionist 
foreign policy” (Richardson, 2014). An essential instrument for spreading neoconservative 
ideas was The Weekly Standard, which was a political magazine founded by William Kristol 
in 1995 (Record, 2010). According to John Dumbrell, The Weekly Standard formed, together 
with the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a key institution of neoconservative 
ideology (2005). Neoconservative sentiments also must have been imperative for William 
Kristol and Robert Kagan to found the PNAC in 1997. As stated by Tom Barry, the think 
tank was created to promote policies that would enable the U.S. to reign supreme in the new 
century (2006).
The years from 1996 to 1998 were a particularly productive period for the 
neoconservative idea entrepreneurs. For example, the founders of PNAC, Kristol and Kagan, 
1 The most significant primary sources are George W. Bush’s speeches and remarks. Others are 
newspaper articles. The most important secondary source this research draws on is Sjöstedt’s article 
that developed the theoretical framework at use here. 
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wrote an article for Foreign Affairs, in which they used the term “rogue state” to describe Iraq 
(1996). It does not require much fantasy to conclude that Iraq was presented as a threat in this 
context since the term “rogue state” itself implies a threat. Furthermore, as stated above, 1997 
was the founding year of the PNAC, in whose Statement of Principles it said that “America 
has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If 
we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history 
of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before 
crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire” (Abrams et al., 1997). 
In the same year, The Weekly Standard published an article that called for regime change 
in Iraq with military means. It further claimed dangerous progress in Saddam Hussein’s 
program to develop WMDs (Kristol and Kagan, 1997). Such statements implied that Iraq 
constituted a threat that needed to be taken care of before it could “become dire” (Abrams et 
al., 1997). In concurrence with this displaying of Saddam’s Iraq as a threat, a PNAC letter 
sent to President Bill Clinton in January 1998 directly called for regime change via military 
means (Abrams et al., 1998). However, the Clinton administration did not seem to show 
much interest in a solution involving the U.S. military (Loeb, 1998). The neoconservative 
idea entrepreneurs failed to convince the U.S. government to remove Saddam Hussein via the 
means they advocated.
With the Bush administration, the position of the idea entrepreneurs improved. As 
Charles-Philippe David holds, one strategy for entrepreneurs is to “position themselves as 
wielders of influence within the administration’s decision-making process” (2015). Hence, 
when many of them became part of the U.S. government, neoconservatives assumed a 
position of power, which is a crucial factor for increasing the entrepreneurs’ credibility and 
the attention paid to the idea (Sjöstedt, 2013). In other words, the probability that the central 
decision-maker, President George W. Bush, got exposed to the idea and decided in favor of 
the neoconservative agenda could be increased drastically.
Not long after Bush’s election, members of the administration addressed Iraq. 
Consequently, the Bush administration discussed the issue without, however, achieving any 
clear consensus (Mazarr, 2007). Nevertheless, “national security advice to the president 
was dominated by Vice President Cheney, and he was effectively able to manage the policy 
process” (Pfiffner, 2009). His preferences concurred with neoconservative ideas about 
the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Paul Wolfowitz, who served as Deputy Secretary of 
Defense under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the time, also pushed for actions 
against Saddam (Mazarr, 2007). Nevertheless, the debates during the early administration 
lacked urgency and did not result in any actions (Mazarr, 2007).
2.2.  The Neoconservatives’ Establishing a Connection Between Iraq and the 
Terrorist Threat After 9/11
David writes that entrepreneurs “must take advantage of opportunities to frame the 
available options in the way most favorable to their view” (2015). With the events of 9/11, 
such an opportunity came along. Michael J. Mazarr supports the intentionality of these 
endeavors by stating that they “used the post-9–11 atmosphere to promote a policy option in 
which they fervently believed” (2007).
However, the proponents of regime change had to explain Saddam Hussein’s involvement 
logically. On September 20, for instance, a letter from the PNAC was sent to Bush. This 
letter suggested the possibility that Iraq was involved in the terrorist attacks. The letter went 
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on to argue for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in the context of fighting terrorism, even if 
lacking evidence for his involvement (Kristol et al., 2001). Record states that the underlying 
logic of this argument was that the assistance from a rogue state was needed to conduct “such 
spectacular actions” (2010). When the terrorist attacks on the U.S. happened, it only required 
a slight adjustment of the threat idea to effectively utilize the event for their purposes. This 
adjustment was the linkage of the Iraqi threat with the war on terror.
Since President Bush eventually made a securitizing move, it can be assumed that the 
idea entrepreneurs’ calculations tallied. Thus, this article concludes that not only the linkage 
of terrorism and rogue states but also the idea of Iraq as a threat to the U.S. were successfully 
diffused after 9/11. The next essential task is now to identify the identities that functioned as 
catalysts for the acceptance of the threat idea.
3. IDENTITIES AS CATALySTS FOR THE THREAT ACCEPTANCE
3.1. The U.S.’ Democratic Identity 
According to Jarrod Hayes, a democratic identity is not only decisive in regard to the 
relationship between democratic countries—states increasingly believe that democracies do 
not engage in activities of war with each other (Wendt, 1999)—but also consequential for 
how democratic states interact with others that do not belong to this group (2016). 
Additionally to the constitution of the Self, ideas about the Other are also part of 
identities (Wendt, 1999). Hayes states that decision-makers in democratic countries “attempt 
to demonstrate that the external actor is beyond reason or trust and could use violence against 
the home state (an existential threat)” to justify policies involving force against such states. 
This behavior includes stressing how undemocratic they are (2016).
One example is the stark contrast in the U.S. policies toward the nuclear developments 
of India and Iran. While Iran, a state that signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was 
presented as threatening, the same did not happen in regard to India despite its not even being 
a signatory to the NPT (Hayes, 2009). Hayes holds that “in democracies, securitization fails 
when the object is also generally regarded as a democracy” (2012). The undemocratic nature 
of an allegedly threatening Other, however, has the opposite effect. It drastically increases the 
likelihood of the securitization to succeed. 
This article argues that such an identity also matters for the acceptance of a threat idea by 
decision-makers themselves because they possess the same democratic identity as the general 
public. As Hayes states, “leaders have internalized the democratic norms and identity, shaping 
their personal perception of threat” (2009). Thus, it is only logical that the presentation of 
a regime as undemocratic increases the probability that it is perceived as a threat. The idea 
entrepreneurs instrumentalized the democratic identity when trying to convince Bush of the 
Iraqi threat. Brian C. Schmidt and Michael C. Williams hold that “[a] democratic Iraq, it was 
argued, would result in a dramatic change in its foreign policy and would remove the terrorist 
threat that was (erroneously) argued to emanate from Baghdad” (2008). This argument 
undoubtedly implies a connection between the threat and Iraq’s undemocratic political 
system. In this way, the idea entrepreneurs could link their idea to Bush’s existing democratic 
identity.
Moreover, if democratic states do not pose a threat, the global spread of democracy can 
be presented as desirable. Why neoconservatives did so when diffusing the idea that Iraq 
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constitutes a threat becomes more apparent when considering that “[t]o be an authentic 
neoconservative was to be a crusader of sorts, if not on God’s behalf at least on behalf 
of liberal democratic ideals” (Bacevich and Prodromou, 2004). The U.S.’ identity as a 
“democratizer” after 9/11 (Sjöstedt, 2007) is thus related to its general democratic identity. 
According to Eric Van Rythoven, the “narrative of a destiny of democracy promotion and 
combating tyranny came to represent a unique and desirable self-image, an identity [italics in 
the original] of ‘American Exceptionalism’” (2016). Active democracy promotion is, thus, 
of further importance because it establishes a relation between the democratic identity and 
American exceptionalism, which is covered in the following section.
3.2. American Exceptionalism 
American exceptionalism is characterized by the conviction that the U.S. is not only 
superior and without equal but also “blessed by the divine […] for a special mission” 
(Chapman, 2014). However, the early Puritan settlers advocated an exemplary kind of 
exceptionalism. Henry W. Brands writes that exemplarists see the U.S.’ responsibility only in 
serving as an example and are afraid that intervening in other states’ issues “could jeopardize 
American values at the source.” On the opposite side are the vindicators, who believe that 
military power should be utilized to deal with evil (1998). At the beginning of Bush’s first 
term, it seemed like a more exemplaristic form of exceptionalism was to be expected. For 
instance, Bush “argued that an arrogant and overbearing U.S. interventionism would generate 
resentment and only complicate U.S. foreign relations” (Herrmann and Reese, 2004).
However, the neoconservatives’ positions concurred with the description of vindicators 
above. Military intervention to enforce regime change and the subsequent establishment 
of a democratic political system are clear indicators of the imperialistic interpretation of 
American exceptionalism. As Barry holds, “exceptionalism and supremacy” were part of the 
PNAC’s Statement of Principles from 1997 already (2006). Therefore, the neoconservative 
ideology brought a rather imperialistic version of American exceptionalism into the Bush 
administration. Nonetheless, Bush did not decide in favor of regime change in Iraq through 
military means before September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks on the U.S., again, proved to 
be the decisive event.
Mike Milford argues that 9/11 revealed how vulnerable the U.S. was and endangered 
the superior feeling resulting from American exceptionalism: “When such crises occur, they 
undermine that assumption of supremacy and jeopardize the national identity it sustains” 
(2016). Such a loss of security concerning one’s identity requires an adequate response to 
counteract. Thus, President Bush made an effort to restore the identity of the U.S. (Milford, 
2016) and emphasized its superior position. He utilized American exceptionalism to “[give] 
the audience a familiar frame through which to view the current crisis” (Milford, 2016). In 
other words, the Bush administration counteracted the insecurity of American identity by 
stressing the U.S.’ exceptionality. Bush, in this way, brought exceptionalism to the fore again.
Then, the neoconservatives used the attacks from September 11, 2001, as a chance to 
substantiate “‘America’s Mission’ to reshape the world” (Cha, 2015). Many justifications used 
by the neoconservatives were already deeply anchored in the self-conception of Americans. 
The neoconservatives easily connected their idea and American identity in this context. 
Consequently, this already existing aspect of Bush’s identity could be deftly altered. As the 
Bush Doctrine showed, the identity of exceptionalism moved closer toward its imperialistic 
form. Maria Helena de Castro Santos and Ulysses Tavares Teixeira “identify four major 
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tenets in the Bush Doctrine: preemption, unilateralism, military supremacy and the exporting 
of democracy” (2013). These principles show the influence of exceptionalism. Unilateralism 
can be viewed as exemption. Supremacy is a defining feature of American exceptionalism 
as well. What indicates this doctrine’s imperialistic interpretation of exceptionalism is 
the advocation of preemption to deal with threats and the establishment of democracy in 
the targeted state. As de Castro Santos and Tavares Teixeira state, in the Bush Doctrine, 
democracy was “the ultimate and definitive solution to terrorism and tyranny” (2013). Hence, 
the events of 9/11 made it easier to resort to an imperialistic interpretation of exceptionalism 
in order to establish democracy in Iraq. Nicholas J. Wheeler comes to a related conclusion 
when he writes that the Bush administration used the unique terrorist threat to the U.S. as a 
justification for “laying claim to special rights that it wishes to deny to others” and “[using] 
its position of military superiority to promote a world safe for democratic values, and is thus 
justified in deciding when other states should forfeit their sovereign rights” (2003). Against 
this backdrop, it becomes difficult to avoid the argument that American exceptionalism 
facilitated the acceptance of the idea that Iraq and Saddam Hussein constituted a threat that 
needed to be addressed. 
3.3. The Influence of Religion 
In a democratic political system, it is necessary to tolerate religious differences (Hayes, 
2009). In other words, the democratic identity overwrites religious identity to a certain degree 
and makes it more difficult to resort to the Christian identity of the majority of Americans as 
opposed to Iraq’s being primarily Islamic. Thus, at first glance, it seems likely that Christian 
identity was not decisive. However, there is a loophole in American identity that enables the 
exertion of influence by the religious identity of the U.S. on the acceptance of the threat idea. 
This loophole is civil religion.
Civil religion makes it possible for the government to uphold the principle of religious 
tolerance while simultaneously drawing from the Christian religion. According to Lee 
Marsden, “civil religion is based on a protestant belief system or morality and values and the 
need for a religious foundation to life. Divine characteristics are ascribed to the United States 
itself, while the president, rather than any religious leader, in times of crisis becomes pastor-
in-chief” (2011). It is essentially the “intertwining of religion and patriotism” (Chapman, 
2014). Civil religion creates an identity shared by all Americans. It further allows presidents 
to “draw from a Christian heritage, and often individual Christian belief, without alienating 
believers of other faiths and non-believers” (Marsden, 2011).
One significant consequence of civil religion combined with a self-perception based on 
exceptionalism was the enablement of an identity construction that juxtaposed in opposition 
the U.S. and terrorists after September 11. To be sure, Bush’s personal beliefs most likely 
gave the impetus to initiate this identity construction of a “good” Self against an “evil” 
Other that was constituted by terrorists and their supporters. However, such a constitution 
could be effective only due to the civil religion permeating American society and the self-
understanding as a country chosen by God. Neil J. Smelser holds that a close connection 
between a country and God can lead to strife with another state being framed in terms of good 
against evil (2004). Furthermore, as Wade Clark Roof states, “[w]ith this identification of an 
enemy there came a resurfacing of the nation’s myths of innocence and goodness” (2009). 
The new identity construction as the good U.S. versus evil terrorists and exceptionalism, 
which emphasizes America’s goodness, reinforced one another. This article thus argues that 
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this shared identity brought about by civil religion indirectly allowed for the perception of 
Iraq from a Christian perspective when Iraq was presented as a rogue state that allegedly 
supported Islamist terrorist groups. By establishing this link, the neoconservatives effectively 
shaped this identity construction. The acceptance of Iraq as a threat was consequently 
facilitated.
The diffused idea and the identity aspects together form the foundation for a potential 
internalization by the decision-maker in question. When an idea is diffused, particular 
identities can accelerate or inhibit whether the idea will be embraced or not. Unless, as 
Sjöstedt remarks, the threat is perceived because of a particular identity itself. Identities 
can thus function in both ways (2013). The former demonstrates the connection between 
identity—newly constructed or not—and internalization. As mentioned above, identity serves 
as a facilitator or impediment for a potential internalization of the idea that has been spread.
In summary, the democratic identity, exceptionalism and the religious character of 
American identity all contributed to enabling the idea acceptance. In the case of the identity 
construction of the good U.S. as opposed to evil terrorists, it can be further argued that this 
aspect of identity even constituted the threat to a certain extent. This concurs with the other 
function of identities, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Overall, the internalization 
of the threat idea becomes thus conceivable. If and to which degree this internalization took 
place is addressed in the next section.
Table 1. Effects of Identity Constructions on the Idea Acceptance
Aspect of the 






The Iraqi threat was connected 
to its undemocratic political 
system
Iraq appeared more 
threatening because 






moved toward a more 
imperialistic form
Increased influence of 
neoconservatives in the Bush 
administration &
National vulnerability after 9/11
Iraq was more likely 




Good U.S. versus evil 
terrorists (including 
its rogue state 
supporters)
The utilization of religious 
concepts such as “good” and 
“evil” &
Iraq’s alleged support of 
terrorists
Iraq appeared to be a 
greater threat due to its 
leadership’s implied evil 
nature
88 ALExANDER SCHOTTHOEFER・OUNG ByUN
4. BUSH’S BELIEFS AND THE INTERNALIZATION OF THE THREAT
 
4.1. The Process of Bush’s Internalization of the Threat Idea
According to Bush himself, his administration was going to be characterized by 
humbleness (Bacevich and Prodromou, 2004). As Richard K. Herrmann and Michael J. 
Reese write, Bush expressed that imperiously intervening would cause irritation and thus 
impede relations with other countries (2004). Consequently, it can be assumed that he did not 
perceive any foreign countries as immediate threats to the U.S.’ national security at this point. 
Thus, the idea of a threatening Iraq was not internalized yet.
Before 9/11, Bush was not entirely satisfied with the current policy toward Iraq but saw 
non-military options as plausible (Woodward, 2004). Mazarr, who interviewed former senior 
government officials in the Bush administration, supports this evaluation by stating that “no 
one with whom I spoke read the meeting as an indication that George Bush was anxious to 
go after Saddam” (2007). This statement refers to the first meetings of the National Security 
Council during the early Bush administration in January and February 2001 that addressed 
the Iraq issue. Hence, Bush did not seem to perceive Iraq as an urgent threat yet.
9/11 was decisive for the internalization process as well. To roughly demonstrate that an 
internalization process took place, this article divides it into three stages. These three stages 
are 1) when Bush viewed Iraq as threatening but not sufficiently to justify preemptive war, 
2) when he began to consider going to war and gave instructions to plan such an option and 
3) when the actual decision for military intervention was made. The second and third stages 
are viewed as a progressive intensification of the threat perception because unilateral military 
action hints at a greater threat due to the underlying urgency, especially when the use of force 
is preemptive. Hence, if Bush was willing to go down this path, it is likely that the perceived 
threat was significant enough to risk great reputation loss, which Bush himself declared to not 
only be aware of but also trying to avoid before as well as at the beginning of his presidency.
David Mitchell and Tansa George Massoud hold that the terrorist attacks not only 
changed President Bush’s perception of Iraq but consequently also led to more support for the 
idea of the neoconservative advisors to Bush (2009). Nonetheless, the internalization of the 
threat idea did not seem to have reached its climax yet right after the attacks. On September 
19, for example, when asked about a connection of Iraq with the attacks eight days prior, 
Bush avoided making any direct statement about Iraq and said that “anybody who houses a 
terrorist, encourages terrorism will be held accountable. And we are gathering all evidence 
on this particular crime and other crimes against freedom-loving people” (2001b). While the 
idea of terrorist-supporting states was established at this point, such an evasive statement 
makes possible the interpretation that the idea of the Iraqi threat was not internalized enough 
to make any confident statements about a direct relationship between Saddam Hussein and 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, one day 
later, Bush also made no mention of Saddam Hussein or any connection of Iraq with the 
attacks in the context of the war on terror (2001c). Furthermore, Bob Woodward states that 
Bush was actually worried that Wolfowitz and Cheney might be trying to “settle old scores 
with Saddam Hussein” (2002).
However, even if Bush was not confident enough about the Iraqi threat to make an 
explicit statement at this point, he indeed began to internalize the idea shortly after September 
11. Richard Clarke recalls President Bush’s giving the following instructions just one day 
after the attacks: “See if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked in any way.” Even Clarke’s 
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assuring that there was no evidence for such a connection was followed up by Bush with the 
repeated instruction to inspect Iraq (2004). Thus it can be safely assumed that Bush started 
to internalize the idea that Iraq was a threat since he suspected Saddam Hussein to be a 
supporter of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. Consequently, Bush pushed his team to uncover 
evidence that would support such a suspicion.
On September 17, only six days after the attacks, George W. Bush signed the war plan for 
Afghanistan, which also contained the instruction for the Pentagon to plan options to invade 
Iraq. Whether this can be regarded as a sign that Bush ordered the planning of a military 
operation at this point is questionable, in any case. As Glenn Kessler further remarks, this 
direction to plan a potential war in Iraq was mentioned in the more than 20 pages long 
document “almost as a footnote” (2003). At the latest in November 2001, it became clear, 
however, that Bush began to seriously consider the option to go to war with Iraq when he 
asked Rumsfeld to plan the invasion (Woodward, 2004). One speech act proving that Bush 
was considering the option of war was the following utterance: “Saddam’s a threat. This is an 
option” (Woodward, 2004).
In the State of the Union Address from January 29, 2002, Bush made one of the most 
explicit statements about the threat emanating from the Iraqi leadership by directly claiming 
that Iraq supported terrorists. Intentions to preemptively attack Iraq, however, were not 
explicitly stated (2002). James P. Pfiffner suspects that Bush “made up his own mind about 
the war sometime early in 2002” (2009). Richard Haass recalls Condoleezza Rice’s telling 
him that Bush decided for war in early July 2002 (Lemann, 2003). Therefore, at the latest in 
July, George W. Bush fully internalized the idea that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a threat 
severe enough to enforce regime change by military means. In September of the same year, 
President Bush sought a congressional resolution that would authorize such a use of force 
(Mazarr, 2007).
The fast nature of the internalization process leads to the assumption that George W. 
Bush’s beliefs concurred with the threat idea to a great extent because concurring beliefs 
accelerate the internalization (Sjöstedt, 2013). Hence, the next section of this article examines 
which of Bush’s beliefs enabled such a quick internalization of the threat idea.
Tracing the internalization also adds weight to the argument that Bush’s threat perception 
was not entirely founded on supposed evidence of WMDs presented to him. While it is 
impossible to exclude an effect of the intelligence reports he received, the concurrence of 
observable change over time with the measurable change of his operational code—which is 
explicated below—lends credibility to this approach. Against this backdrop, it becomes less 
likely that the Iraq War occurred due to reasons predicted by traditional realist approaches 
to security. Even until well after Saddam was overthrown, substantial evidence of WMDs 
was not uncovered. It appears most plausible that Bush internalized the idea of an Iraqi 
threat for reasons that can be found in ideational factors, identity and personal beliefs. Even 
if unsubstantial intelligence reports demonstrating the alleged existence of WMDs affected 
Bush, it remains likely that they did so because of the factors laid out in this article. 
4.2. The Change of Bush’s Operational Code
Operational code refers to “a significant portion of the actor’s entire set of beliefs about 
political life” (George, 1969) with two separate belief categories: instrumental beliefs 
about how to achieve certain political outcomes and philosophical beliefs “[referring] to 
assumptions and premises [...] regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of 
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political conflict, the role of the individual in history, etc.” (George, 1969).
According to Sam Robison, Bush initially had a “moderately strong, positive belief 
in the use of cooperation toward achieving his policy objectives” and saw “himself as a 
benign leader in a moderately friendly world” (2006). Bush viewed the world as relatively 
harmonious and believed that cooperation was an effective approach to achieve one’s political 
goals. In regard to cooperation, Bush was even above the average of pre-9/11 U.S. presidents 
(Robison, 2006). As the results of Jonathan Renshon’s study demonstrate, Bush’s beliefs 
about the nature of the political universe were reinforced when he became president. He 
then viewed it even more optimistically (2008). It is plausible to assume that such optimistic 
political beliefs constituted a significant hindrance to the successful diffusion of the idea that 
Iraq was a threat that had to be taken care of urgently. By 2002, however, regime change 
in Iraq became the highest priority in the U.S.’ foreign policy despite rather weak evidence 
(Bacevich and Prodromou, 2004). The obvious reason for this policy change to suggest 
would be the terrorist attacks. However, not the attacks themselves, but the resulting changes 
in George W. Bush’s operational code were decisive for this policy change. After 9/11, 
Bush’s political beliefs changed quite drastically. Robison holds that Bush became not only 
“more conflict-oriented and hostile toward the rest of the world” but also “more pessimistic 
regarding the realization of his goals” (2006).
Renshon’s study of Bush’s operational code results in the same findings (2008), thus 
offering more evidence that Bush’s decisive political beliefs indeed changed. Renshon 
further writes that Bush’s “conception of the ‘other’ shifted dramatically” (2008). Against 
this backdrop, it is not surprising that Bush’s perception of Iraq as a threat increased 
after 9/11. He viewed the world as significantly more conflictual and hostile. Hence, the 
neoconservatives’ attempts to portray Iraq and Saddam Hussein as threatening matched well 
with Bush’s newly changed perception of the world itself. Robison similarly speculates that 
the philosophy of the more hawkish advisors in Bush’s administration seemed to be more 
reasonable to the president. Offensive action now appeared to be necessary (2006).
Interestingly, and crucial for one of the central arguments of this article—that George 
W. Bush as an individual made a decisive difference—Bush’s advisors did not change much 
after 9/11 regarding their political beliefs. While Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz—three 
primary idea entrepreneurs—held quite pessimistic and conflictual views of the world, more 
dovish members of the Bush administration such as Powell thought of it in more “cooperative 
and friendly” terms. According to Robison’s findings, they maintained their views even after 
the terrorist attacks (2006). These findings imply that the events of 9/11 were not necessarily 
causing a change in U.S. foreign policy. The fact that George W. Bush was the leader of the 
country played a crucial role in bringing about this new direction. Another president might 
have kept his more cooperative beliefs of the political world—assuming that they would have 
been cooperative to begin with—just like Powell did even after the shock of 9/11.
Religious beliefs could be a decisive factor explaining why George W. Bush’s operational 
code shifted after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. Below, this article elaborates on the 
specific role played by Bush’s religious beliefs for his changing perception of the world and, 
consequently, Iraq. 
4.3. Bush’s Religious Beliefs 
Andrew J. Bacevich and Elizabeth H. Prodromou hold that how Bush saw the global 
role of the U.S. was not influenced much by his religious convictions before the presidential 
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election (2004). This circumstance does not mean that he did not hold religious views. 
Instead, it seems that he did not apply them to foreign affairs before his presidency. One 
reason could be his “inexperience in world affairs” to which Bush himself admitted (Daalder 
and Lindsay, 2003). However, he undoubtedly held particular religious beliefs that influenced 
how he approached politics. The prominent position religious guiding principles took in 
George W. Bush’s political life is demonstrated by his own words in A Charge to Keep: “I 
could not be governor if I did not believe in a divine plan that supersedes all human plans. 
Politics is a fickle business. Polls change. [...] My faith frees me. Frees me to put the problem 
of the moment in proper perspective. [...] Frees me to do the right thing, even though it may 
not poll well” (1999). Thus, religious values played a role for Bush already before 9/11 and 
even before he became the U.S. president. After 9/11 occurred, however, Bush’s rhetoric 
could be characterized as “messianic and crusading.” Lauren F. Turek speculates that Bush’s 
response to 9/11 was influenced by “his experiences as a governor, incorporating religious 
rhetoric into his political philosophy” (2014).
As Bacevich and Prodromou argue, after 9/11, “religion offered an immediately available 
frame of reference that enabled President Bush to make sense of otherwise senseless events” 
(2004). They further state that “Bush had to rely on his own resources and trust his own 
instincts. Thus the personal theology of George W. Bush began to infuse itself into the Bush 
administration’s statecraft” (2004). Hence, since 9/11, his religious values exerted influence 
on American foreign policy (Bacevich and Prodromou, 2004). This religious impact on U.S. 
foreign policy became evident through how the war on terror, as well as the Bush Doctrine, 
was articulated in distinctly religious language (den Dulk and Rozell, 2011).
Religious elements have been used in President Bush’s remarks and speeches frequently. 
To be sure, one could argue that Bush himself did not draft the latter. However, Bush’s 
principal speechwriter, Michael Gerson, knew and shared his faith (Mayer and Rozell, 
2005). Moreover, Bush requested Gerson to include biblical references in the speeches he 
wrote for him, which are, as Alexander Moens phrases it, “pieces of Bush’s own identity” 
(2004). For these reasons, it can be assumed that Bush’s speechwriter had similar values and 
reflected Bush’s religious convictions in his speeches. Inferring Bush’s views regarding his 
religiosity from these speeches thus becomes viable and valid. Therefore, this article does not 
distinguish between spontaneous remarks and prepared speeches.
4.3.1. The Universal Desirability of Freedom
In his first inaugural address, Bush said that “[o]ur democratic faith is more than the 
creed of our country. It is the inborn hope of our humanity” (2001a), thus expressing that all 
humans equally desire democracy. Three years later, in his 2003 State of the Union Address, 
Bush revealed the religious nature of his belief in the universal value of freedom: “[T]he 
liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world; it is God’s gift to humanity” (2003). Not 
only is freedom a universal value but also given to humanity by God.
Here civil religion is of importance again. Robert N. Bellah states that one “important 
tradition of interpretation” is constituted by the ideas that “America is God’s country, and 
that American power in the world is identical with morality and God’s will” (1980). To be 
sure, the fact that there is a shared American identity under civil religion does not mean that 
such an extreme interpretation is necessarily shared as well. However, when taking a look 
at George W. Bush’s post-9/11 speeches, it becomes apparent that he shared this particular 
interpretation of civil religion to a certain degree. Consequently, civil religion had a 
significant impact on how Bush viewed the role of the U.S. in the world after the September 
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11 terrorist attacks. Since Bush relied on his religious compass immediately after the attacks 
occurred, his convictions came to the fore. Together with civil religion, they established a 
clear mission from Bush’s perspective. Jillinda Weaver writes that “George W. Bush mixes 
civil religion and mission, religious symbolism and legitimation of national purpose” (2008).
What all of this means is that George W. Bush saw a religiously infused mission for the 
U.S. Based on his conviction that freedom is a universal value desired by all peoples, the U.S.’ 
duty became the fight for freedom. In 2002, for example, Bush’s State of the Union Address 
included the following words: “We choose freedom and the dignity of every life. […] We 
have known freedom’s price. We have shown freedom’s power. And in this great conflict, my 
fellow Americans, we will see freedom’s victory” (2002).
For the securitizing move, this is meaningful insofar as Bush’s convictions about the 
universal nature of freedom and the desire of all humans to achieve it matched with the 
diffused idea. According to Weaver, the desire of Iraqi people to live free of an oppressing 
regime could be assumed by Bush because his beliefs implied that people in Iraq, just like 
anywhere else, want to live in freedom (2008). However, since the lack of freedom of 
other peoples does not necessarily threaten the U.S., this aspect of Bush’s religious beliefs 
should be viewed more as a factor that facilitated the securitizing move. In other words, it 
further legitimized it from his perspective. More central to Bush’s actual threat perception 
concerning Iraq and Saddam Hussein was the second significant aspect of his beliefs in the 
post-9/11 context, which was the existence of both good and evil.
4.3.2. The Struggle Between Good and Evil
John M. Murphy writes that “[f]or President Bush, the world is, as it ever was, divided 
between good and evil” (2003). These two opposites are further in a struggle between each 
other in which the U.S. is located on the side of the good, while its enemies are considered 
evil (Herrmann and Reese, 2004). The terrorists who attacked innocent people on September 
11 assumed the evil side. To Bush, pure maliciousness was the only reason for the terrorist’s 
actions (Bacevich and Prodromou, 2004). Correspondingly, the above-mentioned mission of 
the U.S. had another aspect to it, which was to “rid the world of evil-doers” (Perez-Rivas, 
2001).
All it took to fuse the terrorist threat with an alleged threat emanating from Iraq was the 
idea of rogue states. If Iraq was a rogue state and supporter of terrorists, it belonged to the 
evil side of the struggle between good and evil. In this way, it constituted a threat to the U.S. 
Together with the accusation that Saddam Hussein possessed WMDs, the threat appeared to 
be a real and indeed immediate one. Hence, the 2002 State of the Union Address said that 
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime 
has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade. [...] This is 
a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these and their terrorist 
allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of 
mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to 
terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. (Bush, 2002) 
According to Bacevich and Prodromou, “Bush’s theology gives him confidence in his 
own ability to discern good from evil” (2004). Combined with his tendency to rely on his 
instinct (Pfiffner, 2004), it is plausible to assume that for President Bush, it was essentially 
a gut decision whether something was to be considered good or evil. Therefore, it is not 
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surprising that he internalized an idea that made sense to him. 
The idea diffusion matched Bush’s beliefs so well because the neoconservatives thought 
about the world in similar ways. Similarly to George W. Bush, they “tended to see the world 
in stark, with-us-or-against-us terms.” Moreover, they were long convinced “of American 
righteousness and of its mission to the world.” However, for neoconservatives, it was less 
about a fight between good and evil, but more about opposing political systems—namely 
democracy versus dictatorship (Bacevich and Prodromou, 2004). Bush and neoconservatives 
had, in this sense, corresponding worldviews. One was based on a more religious fundament, 
while the other was framed in a more secular manner (Bacevich and Prodromou, 2004). 
Overall, the events of 9/11 forced Bush to utilize his religious compass to navigate the new 
situation. Since his religious beliefs matched extraordinarily well with neoconservative ideas, 
the idea diffusion efforts quickly came to fruition.
As can be seen in the summary table above (Table 2), the decisive beliefs that affected the 
internalization process concurred with the identity aspects significant for the idea acceptance 
and the enablement of the subsequent internalization (see Table 1). The democratic identity 
that allowed for the outgroup perception of dictatorial political systems to a certain degree 
matched the hostile image of parts of the world. However, since the latter became an issue 
only after 9/11 when Bush’s operational code changed, the interpretation that this identity 
mattered specifically after September 11 becomes possible. The overlap of identity and belief 
is even more apparent for the second and third rows in both tables. An imperialistic version 
of exceptionalism that, among other things, advocates the promotion of democracy even by 
force if necessary is strongly undergirded by a belief in the universal desirability of freedom. 
If those peoples wish to be freed, military means can be justified more easily. Also, the belief 
in the existence of good and evil corresponds to the identity construction of the good U.S. 
and evil terrorists and their rogue state supporters. These concurrences hint at a discrepancy 
between the analytical approach and the reality: In actuality, it would not be easy to separate 




The change of Bush’s operational code and the triggering of his preexisting religious 
beliefs in combination with the above-described identities resulted in the securitizing 
Table 2. Effects of Beliefs on the Idea Internalization
Belief Change or Trigger Result
Hostile and 
conflictual world
Belief change in the aftermath of 
9/11
The internalization was facilitated because 
Iraq was perceived as more threatening
Universal desirability 
of freedom
Already existing belief coming 
to the fore because of 9/11
Legitimacy was given to extraordinary 
measures against Iraq
Existence of good 
and evil
Already existing belief coming 
to the fore because of 9/11
The internalization was facilitated because 
Iraq was seen as evil
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move after the threat idea had been diffused. These findings support the assumption that all 
three of these factors have to be scrutinized to effectively make sense of how a threat idea 
was translated into a securitizing move. Each factor additionally comes with its particular 
implications.
5.2. Implications
Idea diffusion efforts can be decisive for whether the securitization of an issue takes 
place or not. This circumstance becomes clear when asking the question of why Iraq was 
securitized while other dictatorships with comparable characteristics and threat potentials 
were not treated in the same manner. While it is undoubtedly clear that North Korea has 
been working on a nuclear weapons program, the results of which could could end up in 
terrorist hands, North Korea was not securitized in the same manner as Iraq because there 
was no immediate idea diffusion of an urgent North Korean threat. Identities and personal 
beliefs could have had a similar impact as they did in the Iraqi case. Consequently, the lack 
of comparable idea diffusion can offer a partial explanation for the irrational and exclusive 
securitization of only one selected rogue state.
Moreover, the analysis of threat constructions and perceptions as well as decision-making 
would benefit significantly from an increased scholarly focus—especially in the field of 
security studies—on whether any identity constructions took place in a given situation. This 
article has shown that Sjöstedt’s framework that incorporates identities indeed comes with 
significant explanatory value. Examining a threat construction process without looking at 
identities can thus inhibit its understanding substantially.
Another implication is that the entire Bush administration might not be the appropriate 
unit of analysis, depending on the research question. Considering the powerful position of 
the U.S. president, an individual-level analysis with him as a separate actor is necessary to 
understand why the administration—or the state as an extension of it due to the government’s 
representative function—acted in a particular way. If one assumes that the president made 
decisions because of his own beliefs and that he genuinely perceived Iraq as a threat, it 
is plausible to conclude that he thought of his actions as doing what is right in the given 
situation. Such a perspective further suggests the absence of expediency. Political motives 
appear unlikely, at least for George W. Bush himself. This conclusion then implicates that 
one needs to pay more attention to the beliefs of an individual with high decision-making 
authority and effects of identities in order to prevent conflict or even war by recognizing 
dynamics and constellations in which threat constructions may take place and potentially 
escalate into an objectively unjustified—due to a lack of evidence of a threat—securitizing 
move.
For the Iraq War specifically, the implication is that an alternative actor perhaps would 
not have made a securitizing move because of differing beliefs and less or no internalization 
of the threat idea. Despite the significance of the events of September 11, which can easily 
be perceived as a primary cause at first glance, Bush as an individual made the decisive 
difference. As the results of Robison’s study of Bush’s and his advisors’ operational codes 
show, the traumatic events of 9/11 did not change every actor’s belief system in the same 
manner. The fact that Powell’s beliefs, for instance, remained more or less cooperative, 
allows for the speculation that another president could have maintained cooperative views of 
the political world even after 9/11 and thus might have handled the situation differently.
Lastly, there is also an implication for securitization theory’s normative aspect due 
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to the ability of beliefs to undergo a transformation. Renshon establishes the following 
implication from his study of Bush’s operational code change: “How beliefs change 
has implications not just for the study of political leaders and decision making but also 
how we attempt to persuade others in the international system. For instance, the United 
States has evinced a desire for China to become more democratically accountable and to 
accept the responsibilities of being a world power. Coercion might change their behavior, 
but it is obviously preferable to effect a change in Chinese leaders’ beliefs about how 
they should act” (2008). Even though Renshon’s research was not conducted within the 
theoretical framework of securitization, a similar conclusion can be drawn in this case. 
The Copenhagen School of securitization theory generally advocates desecuritization 
over securitization. Political solutions to problems are preferred. In order to decrease 
conflict, effecting change in leaders’ beliefs and thus potentially initiating desecuritization 
efforts would be preferable over allowing escalation into further securitization of an issue. 
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